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Abstract  
The EU is forced into a reform deadlock since Member States seem unable to reach a consensus. 
This contribution explores how EU politics shape the path of European integration. By differ-
entiating between the ‘visible’ (politicization and political contestation), and the ‘often not vis-
ible’ dimensions (domestic preference formation and interstate bargaining), we find that polit-
ical obstacles impose limits on the EU’s ability to advance on its integration agenda. Moreover, 
the impact of the corona crisis on EU politics is preliminarily assessed – but, whether the EU is 
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1 Introduction  
How is it possible that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is still incomplete? As long 
as the institutional setup of the EMU is incomplete, the European Union (EU) remains fragile. 
As long as the design flaws of the EMU exacerbate structural divergences, the EU’s long-term 
survival is threatened (De Grauwe, 2015; Giavazzi & Wyplosz, 2015). Not surprisingly, there 
is a common agreement on the need for reform and no shortage of reform proposals (De Grauwe 
& Ji, 2019; Geeroms, 2017; Herzog, 2018). Yet, 22 years after the introduction of the euro in 
1999, there is still a lack of significant reform progress (Jones et al., 2016; Kudrna, 2017). 
What is possibly hindering the implementation of fundamental reforms that could put the 
EU towards a more sustainable path? This question constitutes an important rationale behind 
this paper. Although much research has focused on the need for more far-reaching reforms from 
an economic point of view (De Grauwe, 2015; Giavazzi & Wyplosz, 2015; Rossi, 2016), it 
remains unclear how political dynamics determine the course of European integration. This 
paper explores how EU politics and European integration intertwine. It explains how political 
obstacles present major constraints in the path of European integration. Amid an unprecedented 
global crisis, it is essential to examine how the behind-the-scenes of politics influence the EU 
policy-making process to avert future gridlocks (Peel et al., 2020). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant litera-
ture. Section 3 proposes a theoretical framework to conceptualize the underlying EU political 
conflict structures. The iceberg problem analogy serves to distinguish the ‘visible’ dimensions, 
the politicization of the EU issues, and the political contestation among Member States (MS), 
from the ‘often not visible’ dimensions, the domestic preference formation, and the EU inter-
state bargaining processes. Section 4 discusses how the corona crisis may alter the presented 
iceberg model, and whether the ongoing crisis represents a turning point for European integra-
tion. The last section concludes. 
 
3 
2 Literature review  
The EMU architecture has been identified as incomplete from its inception by separating mon-
etary and fiscal sovereignty (Jones et al., 2016). Although the response to the Euro Area (EA) 
crisis marked “a landmark event in the history of European integration” (Hooghe & Marks, 
2019, p. 1113) by accelerating fiscal and financial integration (Matthijs, 2020; Schimmelfennig, 
2015; Verdun, 2015), the progress made was insufficient (Herzog, 2018; Hodson, 2020; Lehner 
& Wasserfallen, 2019). Former European Commission President Juncker (2017) declared that 
the Eurozone remains to be ‘completed’, referring to the EMU architecture as an unfinished 
construction of a European house.  
While there is an overwhelming consensus on the urgent need for Eurozone reforms, MS 
appear to be unable to agree on future reform steps forcing the EU into deadlock (Kudrna, 
2017). In the aftermath of the EA crisis, studies found that integration progress had resulted 
from an accumulation of “minimal incomplete reforms”, a sequential cycle of partial reforms 
often agreed upon under the strain of a crisis, that only partially solve the problem (Jones et al., 
2016; Kudrna, 2017). While Kudrna (2017) refers to this characteristic pattern of policy re-
sponses as a “muddling through” strategy, Jones et al. (2016) describe it as “failing forward” – 
yet there is a common view that this incremental approach to the construction of the EMU 
threatens the longer-term sustainability of the Eurozone. 
Schmidt (2013, p. 1) was among the first to shed light on the often-unspoken political 
divisions and stated that the “Eurozone crisis is not just economic, it is also political”. Indeed, 
the politically costly implementation of austerity and structural reforms exacerbated political 
volatility creating the perception of a ‘constant crisis’ (Jones et al., 2016) or ‘polycrisis’ (Zeitlin 
et al., 2019). Severe political consequences followed, such as the undermining of popular sup-
port for the EU fueling Euroscepticism, which ultimately further strengthened the paralysis of 
the EU decision-making process (Schimmelfennig, 2015). 
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In their groundbreaking article, Copelovitch et al. (2016) highlight the often undervalued 
role of politics. By introducing a political economy perspective, the authors underline that to 
fully comprehend the dynamics of the EA crisis, it is necessary to consider the “more than a 
decade of tensions accumulating [within the EMU]” (Copelovitch et al., 2016, p. 813). Re-
cently, the unprecedented levels of politicization of EU issues have attracted scholarly interest 
focusing on the growing importance of public opinion (Kutter, 2020; Voltolini et al., 2020; 
Zürn, 2019). Unfortunately, much of the literature on politicization is limited to the ‘visible’ 
events, simply describing how the EU reached a crossroads due to controversial crisis reforms 
(Howarth & Verdun, 2020; Szymanowski, 2020).  
However, the question of how changing political dynamics have forced the EU into a 
reform deadlock still needs to be answered. Lehner and Wasserfallen (2019) recognize that MS 
face a difficult task to advance the EMU reforms, namely to overcome the deep political con-
flict, which Demertzis and Wolff (2020) indicate requires a careful balance between economic 
and political stability in the Eurozone. Furthermore, Wasserfallen et al. (2018, p. 7) provide 
important findings on the underlying EU political structures that help to understand why EU 
policy-makers “failed to adopt more far-reaching solutions”.  
Although these contributions partially explain some aspects of the EU reform deadlock, 
there is still a need for a comprehensive analysis that connects both fields of EU politics and 
European integration studies. This paper seeks to advance this research agenda by conceptual-
izing how EU politics and the course of European integration intertwine. That is, how do EU 
political dynamics impact European integration? Initially, it is hypothesized that EU countries’ 
diverging policy preferences pose political obstacles in the path of European integration.  
Methodologically, the combination of research from both, qualitative and statistical stud-
ies, allowed us to gain encompassing insights on EU politics and European integration. The 
results referred to throughout the paper are presented in the Appendices, such as Eurobarometer 
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qualitative studies, Eurostat statistical analyses, or preference formation studies based on the 
‘EMU positions dataset’. Note that the ambition of this paper is above all conceptual, as it 
explores more in-depth the relationship between contemporary EU politics and the path of Eu-
ropean integration applying management tools to untangle the ‘often not visible’ underlying 
conflict structures from the ‘visible’ political conflict. Only by fully grasping how political 
dynamics contribute to the EU’s state of fragility, the longer-term sustainability of the EU can 
be ensured. Currently, the EU’s ability to tackle crises is once again under the spotlight which 
makes it even more pressing to address the underlying political conflict structures. 
Revisiting European integration theories  
In the study of European integration, it is central to understand the fundamental trade-off be-
tween the ‘benefits of size’ and the ‘costs of heterogeneity’ (Alesina & Spolaore, 2003). Market 
integration reaps benefits of economies of scale in the public good provision on the one hand, 
while political integration leads to heterogeneity costs stemming from diverging policy prefer-
ences and different state capacities on the other (Alesina & Spolaore, 1997, 2003; Alesina et 
al., 2017a, 2017b; Spolaore, 2013, 2015). This cost-benefit trade-off raises questions about the 
drivers of the European integration process, such as what drives European integration, and who 
is ‘in charge’? The three main schools of integration that attempt to answer these questions are 
summarized as follows1 (see also Appendix A). 
Neofunctionalism (NF), developed by Haas (1958/2004), explains integration as the in-
teraction of societal actors which creates ‘a series of mutually reinforcing processes’ through 
‘spillover’ effects and path-dependencies leading to further integration. From a ‘supranational-
ist view’, NF claims that the transfer of national competences towards the supranational level 
occurs due to growing economic interdependence as MS consider EU institutions more prom-




By contrast, Moravcsik (1998) casts light on European integration with Liberal Intergov-
ernmentalism (LI) from the perspective of nation-states who search for mutually advantageous 
bargains in response to international interdependence. LI explains integration outcomes by the 
three-stage process including the formation of national preferences driven by domestic socio-
economic interests, intergovernmental bargaining shaped by asymmetrical interdependence, 
and the creation of European institutions (Dür et al., 2020; Schimmelfennig, 2015; 
Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2019; Schmidt, 2018; Webber, 2019).  
More recently, the increasing politicization of European integration led to the emergence 
of Postfunctionalism (PF), a radical alternative theory of disintegration established by Hooghe 
and Marks (2009), that emphasizes the primacy of the political over the economic. Whereas NF 
and LI describe European integration as a cooperative process (Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 
2019; Webber, 2019), PF sees European integration as a conflictual process due to the “clash 
between nationalism and international governance” (Hooghe & Marks, 2019, p. 1124). Partic-
ularly, the shift from the ‘permissive consensus’ in mass public opinion to a ‘constraining dis-
sensus’ creates “downward pressure on the level and scope of integration” (Hooghe & Marks, 
2009, p. 21). Thus, political mobilization of national identity is identified as a constraining 
factor of integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, 2019).  
In sum, these theoretical approaches can be used in conjunction as complementary expla-
nations of European integration from contrasting standpoints 2  (Hooghe & Marks, 2019; 
Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2019), and provide the framework for this paper.  
3 Theoretical framework  
Understanding how EU politics and European integration intertwine requires simultaneously 
looking at all the levels of EU politics. For this purpose, a theoretical framework is proposed 
(see Figure 1). The design of the framework is inspired by the iceberg model, a visual tool of 
systems thinking strategies developed by Senge (1990). 
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Figure 1. The iceberg model: Exploring how EU political conflict structures impact European integration. Source: Own 
illustration based on the iceberg model developed by Senge (1990) 
 
Applying the iceberg problem analogy serves to illustrate the ‘big picture’ of the complex 
EU decision-making process, increasingly dominated by EU politics. In this model, we distin-
guish between the ‘visible’ and the ‘often not visible’ dimensions. (1) The growing politiciza-
tion of European integration and (2) the political contestation3 among MS constitute the visible 
part of the iceberg above the water surface. Both dimensions have attracted much attention, yet 
these efforts only scratch the surface of the problem. Moving deeper, we analyze the underlying 
structures that contribute to the visible problem. (3) The domestic preference formation com-
prises the aggregation of factors motivating national policy positions on EMU reform, which 
are later negotiated in the (4) EU interstate bargaining process, through which individual MS 
may achieve greater bargaining success in terms of achieving desirable EU policy outcomes. 
This tool allows us to see beyond the symptoms, the reform deadlock in a politically 
volatile environment, and examine the root causes of the problem by exploring the underlying 
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structures of EU politics, preference formation, and interstate bargaining. Although the con-
ceptual model offers a comprehensive view of how EU politics is interlaced with European 
integration, it should be noted that, due to its static nature, the model merely offers a ‘snapshot’ 
view of the interacting levels. Nevertheless, it lays the foundation for a longer-term perspective 
that facilitates the creation of sustainable solutions, instead of temporary, incomplete reforms 
that solely exacerbate the political disequilibrium. 
3.1 The tip of the iceberg 
The EU has experienced a turbulent past decade, also described as a ‘traumatic adolescence’ 
by Wolf (2019), as it has faced numerous, even simultaneous, crises (Hodson & Puetter, 2019; 
Trein, 2020). This state of turmoil referred to as ‘constant crisis’ (Jones et al., 2016) or ‘polycri-
sis’ (Juncker, 2016), amplified the continuous political disequilibrium (Hodson, 2019) putting 
the EU under unprecedented pressure (Bressanelli et al., 2020). As a consequence, the European 
integration process “is more challenged and contested today than it has ever been” (Voltolini et 
al., 2020, p. 619). Hodson and Puetter (2019) suggest that this disequilibrium is the product of 
‘dysfunctional inputs’ including a declining public trust in the EU and domestic political sys-
tems, coupled with ‘dysfunctional outputs’ by consensus-seeking political elites. 
In line with this view, politicization and political contestation are identified as major ob-
stacles to advancing European integration. The European political system has been forced to a 
deadlock, as the politicization of European integration reaches unprecedented levels, and the 
EU cohesion is fractured by ‘polycleavages’4 (Voltolini et al., 2020; Zeitlin et al., 2019). While 
the postfunctionalist approach captures the essence of politicization, a fusion of neofunctional-
ism and new intergovernmentalism is needed to fully grasp the dynamics of political contesta-
tion (Jones et al., 2016).  
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3.1.1 Politicization  
EU leaders “must look over their shoulders when negotiating European issues”, state Hooghe 
and Marks (2009, p. 5). From a postfunctionalist view, politicization constrains European inte-
gration through a domestic level process that shifts the EU political climate to a ‘constraining 
dissensus’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). European politics have undoubtedly become increasingly 
politically charged, yet politicization in the EU is “not a new phenomenon” (Schmidt, 2019, p. 
1020). Since 1990 the politicization of EU affairs has steadily increased until recently reaching 
unprecedented levels (Börzel & Risse, 2018; Rauh & Zürn, 2016). The rising politicization 
accompanied by the increased role for public opinion (Zürn, 2019) has marked the end of the 
‘old EU politics’ that existed during years of ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg & Scheingold, 
1970), and were once characterized as ‘policy without politics’ (Schmidt, 2006). 
Despite the popular use of the concept ‘politicization’, there is still considerable ambigu-
ity in its exact meaning and relevance to the European integration process (De Wilde, 2011). In 
the field of European integration, politicization generally refers to the transfer of an issue or an 
institution “into the realm of public choice”, hereby “making previously unpolitical matters 
political” (Zürn, 2019, p. 978), and becoming “the subject of public discussion, debate, and 
contestation” (Schmidt, 2019, p. 1018). The politicization of European integration is defined 
by De Wilde (2011, p. 560) as “an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and 
the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within 
the EU”. 
Therefore, the process of politicization encompasses different conceptual dimensions. 
First, the growing visibility of EU decision-making, i.e., the actions of EU’s political elites are 
now under public scrutiny, leads to an increase in EU issue salience and contestation 
(Bressanelli et al., 2020; Hutter & Kriesi, 2019; Schmidt, 2019; Voltolini et al., 2020). Second, 
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broader participation in EU affairs is reached through the expansion of the range of actors (be-
yond EU elite actors) (Schimmelfennig, 2020; Zürn, 2019). Third, with the greater public en-
gagement comes an associated polarization of positions actors adopt on EU issues (Hutter & 
Kriesi, 2019; Kutter, 2020; Schimmelfennig, 2020; Voltolini et al., 2020). 
As for the question of why EU politicization is rising, postfunctionalism offers an intuitive 
explanation: as integration expands into key functions of sovereignty, politicization is expected 
(Zeitlin et al., 2019). As mentioned in the literature review, the deepening of European integra-
tion implies a careful balance between economic benefits and political costs. It seems to be 
widely recognized that the EU has moved beyond the economic market integration and entered 
the arena of mass politics triggering the mobilization of national identities and intensified self-
determination concerns (Kuhn, 2019; Schimmelfennig, 2020; Zürn, 2019). Although this may 
be true, citizens’ perception of the EU membership benefits has remained relatively stable and 
considerably higher than the perceived costs (Eurobarometer, 2020a).  
Given that politicization is generally viewed as “a response to a too far-reaching European 
integration” (Zürn, 2019, p. 984), Europeanists perceive it as a problem altering the course of 
European integration (De Wilde, 2011). Hence, politicization constrains efficient EU decision-
making and therefore may endanger or even halt European integration (Schimmelfennig, 2020; 
Zürn, 2019). Moreover, the manifestation of social consequences is predominantly observed at 
the domestic level (Schimmelfennig, 2020). Hutter and Kriesi (2019, p. 996) state that politici-
zation “raises fundamental questions of rule and belonging and taps into various sources of 
conflicts about national identity, sovereignty, and solidarity”, hereby putting national govern-
ments under pressure.  
Eurobarometer polls (2020a) show how public trust levels, together with the positive im-
age of the EU, and support for the single currency, dramatically dropped throughout the EA 
crisis (see Appendix B). Against this backdrop of public discontent, the imposition of harsh 
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fiscal adjustments, especially on the ‘debtor’ countries, set the stage for new political move-
ments and parties (Kutter, 2020). Eurosceptic and challenger parties emerged as they “deliber-
ately used identity politics” (Börzel & Risse, 2018, p. 97), conveniently making the EU the 
scapegoat (Schmidt, 2019), to mobilize latent anti-European attitudes among a minority of cit-
izens. Consequently, public mobilization in an environment of rising national political volatility 
and polarized public debates led to a shift in political landscapes (Schimmelfennig, 2020; 
Schmidt, 2019). At the core of this new political conflict around European integration lie ques-
tions of collective identity (Hooghe & Marks, 2009), that take the form of cultural backlash 
expressing “an alternative vision of Europe” (Kriesi, 2020, p. 7).  
To this day we see the consequences in the steady decreasing trust in European institu-
tions (Eurobarometer, 2020a). Throughout the polycrisis, public trust levels in the EU and Eu-
ropean institutions slowly recovered, surpassing trust levels in national governments, yet falling 
behind pre-2007 levels. In contrast, support for the euro remained relatively high rising sharply 
from 2013 onwards. Similarly, European identity levels have increased or remained stable, ex-
cept for the years leading to 2010, when nationalism peaked with 46% of Europeans identifying 
exclusively with their nation-state against 41% who held Europe as a secondary identity 
(Eurobarometer, 2020a). Thus, while the loss of public trust in the EU had an overall little 
lasting impact on the support for the euro and European identity levels (Börzel & Risse, 2018), 
it is widely believed that the increasingly politicized nature of the EU climate has fundamentally 
altered the course of European integration (Schimmelfennig, 2020). 
3.1.2 Political contestation 
From a ‘new’ intergovernmentalism view, the persistence of EU’s political disequilibrium is 
attributed to MS’ inability to deal with politicization and Eurosceptic challenger parties – not 
to politicization itself (Hodson & Puetter, 2019). In other words, MS with diverse preferences 
appear unable to manage their conflicting demands, failing to reach a collective agreement, and 
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ultimately, leading the Eurozone to a deadlock since MS “act by consensus or not at all” (Puetter 
& Puntscher Riekmann, 2020, p. 2). This argument is based on a fusion of neofunctionalist and 
intergovernmental approaches that conceive European integration as a cooperative process 
(Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2019), in which MS are ‘in charge’ (Puetter & Puntscher 
Riekmann, 2020). Whether integration advances, depends on MS’ willingness to engage in re-
forms – and, as MS are expected to guide their behaviors based on their economic self-interests 
– they will only choose to deepen integration when it serves them by delegating just enough 
authority to the European level (Puetter & Puntscher Riekmann, 2020; Schimmelfennig & 
Winzen, 2019).  
Consequently, EU leaders are forced to settle on lowest common denominator solutions 
which leads to a typical pattern of incomplete, partial policy responses (Hooghe & Marks, 2019; 
Kuhn, 2019). EU scholars have described this gradualist approach to reforms as the ‘failing 
forward’ argument (Jones et al., 2015), the ‘muddling through’ strategy (Kudrna, 2017), or even 
as a ‘political paralysis’ (Börzel & Risse, 2018), but all stress the most significant constraint 
for Eurozone reform is political. Indeed, gradualist reforms rely on preference convergence to 
deliver agreements but this approach is becoming extremely challenging as political contesta-
tion increases (Kudrna, 2017, 2019). Throughout the present work, the term political contesta-
tion refers to the conflictual process through which clashes between a diverse set of EU actors 
– mainly national governments, and European institutions – that either advocate more integra-
tion or less integration, have a bearing on the path of European integration (Marks & 
Steenbergen, 2002). 
The EA crisis provided ample evidence on the existing deep political fissures and raised 
questions whether the creation of the EMU has turned the EU into a polarized, fundamentally 
contested system further separating, instead of uniting, MS (Bressanelli et al., 2020; Frieden & 
Walter, 2017; Kudrna & Wasserfallen, 2020). At times of crisis and under the stress of visible 
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political contestation, EU actors are placed on the horns of a dilemma, forcing a difficult choice 
between European interests and domestic demands (Bressanelli et al., 2020; Puetter & 
Puntscher Riekmann, 2020).  
Overall, efforts made by MS may have helped to save the single currency, but their polit-
ical choices have not escaped criticism and been blamed for amplifying the EU’s disequilibrium 
(Hodson, 2019; Hodson & Puetter, 2019). A growing body of literature suggests that the EA 
crisis is rooted in the EU political economy, and fundamentally, in the underlying, unresolved 
conflict structures that generate mounting socio-political tensions on distributional issues, 
threatening the future of the monetary union itself (Copelovitch et al., 2016; Frieden & Walter, 
2017; Puetter & Puntscher Riekmann, 2020).  
It is well known that during the EA crisis, the Eurozone’s political cleavage widened as 
a result of the intensified distributional conflicts among MS (De Grauwe, 2019; Schäfer et al., 
2020), which portrayed a lack of European solidarity (Jones & Matthijs, 2017). Eurostat data 
confirms how the asymmetrical cost of adjustment5 reinforced the macroeconomic divergences 
within the EMU (Eurostat, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c), widening the divide between the so-called 
creditor-debtor, the North-South, or the Core-Periphery (Copelovitch et al., 2016; Matthijs & 
Merler, 2020; Stockhammer et al., 2020) (see Appendix C).  
This distributional conflict reflected in the current account imbalances is commonly dis-
cussed in the context of EU politics to explain diverging positions on EMU reforms, e.g., ex-
port-oriented, creditor countries with a budgetary surplus advocate for fiscal discipline, while 
import-oriented, debtor countries with a budget deficit ask for more fiscal transfers (Kudrna, 
2017; Kudrna & Wasserfallen, 2020; Trein, 2020). Advocates of fiscal discipline claim that 
strict deficit and debt rules are required to stabilize the monetary union, whereas supporters for 
fiscal transfers argue that account imbalances can only be stabilized through transfers, as the 
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EMU deprives MS of fundamental stabilizing instruments (De Grauwe, 2013; De Grauwe & Ji, 
2015; Pisani-Ferry, 2014). 
Interestingly, Lehner and Wasserfallen (2019) find that this particular one single-dimen-
sional policy conflict between advocates of fiscal transfer and discipline dominates EMU poli-
tics. Their in-depth scaling analysis relies on the ‘EMU Positions’ dataset including positions 
of all EU MS and six EU institutions for 47 contested issues of the recent EMU reforms between 
2010 and 2015. It shows how political contestation was shaped by the longstanding conflict 
among two opposing coalitions: the ‘North’ prioritizing fiscal discipline and the ‘South’ advo-
cating for more fiscal transfers. Importantly, the empirical findings reveal how the politics of 
EMU reform in general, independently of the range of the policy proposals, are structured by 
the underlying conflict between fiscal transfer and discipline. Additionally, the spatial distribu-
tion of EU countries on this one-dimensional scale highlights the key role of France and Ger-
many as ‘leaders’ of both opposing coalitions. Although Germany may be pressured by coun-
tries with more extreme positions such as Finland and the Netherlands, the fact that France and 
Germany hold positions at the opposing ends offers an ‘ideal setting’ for Franco-German pro-
posals to potentially gain support from both MS groups, and thereby unblock the reform grid-
lock. This implies that the two opposing coalitions are required to reach compromises and trade 
concessions through a constant negotiation process (Lehner & Wasserfallen, 2019) (see Appen-
dix D). Consequently, as political contestation increases, the EU political conflict deepens, and 
political consensus becomes harder to achieve, thereby posing a major constraint on European 
integration (Bressanelli et al., 2020). 
3.2 The underlying political conflict structures 
What determines countries’ positions for EU negotiations? And how are divergencies aggre-
gated at the European level to achieve (or not) consensus? The next section considers both 
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questions to cast light on how the behind-the-scenes of EU politics impacts European integra-
tion. The theoretical point of departure is that European integration can only advance through 
joint action, or more specifically, consensus on reforms through the negotiation of compromises 
(Biermann et al., 2019; Frieden & Walter, 2018; Kudrna, 2019). More broadly, European inte-
gration is determined by the EU policy-making process which can be divided into the demand 
side for reform, the national preference formation, and the supply side for reform, the EU inter-
state bargaining process (Biermann et al., 2019; Wasserfallen et al., 2018).  
To make sense of the EU political economy, it is therefore essential to analyze how these 
underlying processes contribute to the ‘visible’ political conflicts and reform outcomes that 
shape the future path of European integration (Frieden & Walter, 2018). Importantly, the do-
mestic and EU-level policy-making process cannot be contemplated separately, as they are in-
terwoven and simultaneously at work, constantly interacting with each other (Csehi & Puetter, 
2020; Karremans, 2020).  
Hence, in the context of the shifting dynamics of EU governance with all EU actors be-
coming increasingly empowered but also mutually dependent, rather than asking ‘who is in 
charge of European integration’, it is more appropriate to investigate whether and how the com-
plex political multi-level interactions translate into reform outcomes (Carstensen & Schmidt, 
2018; Schmidt, 2018). 
3.2.1 Domestic preference formation 
There is a widespread notion that the EU decision-making process is constantly challenged by 
the heterogeneity in MS’ national interests, yet there is still considerable disputation about the 
drivers of the preference formation process (Alesina et al., 2017a; Csehi & Puetter, 2020).  
LI contends that governmental preferences on European integration stem from “critical 
positive or negative interdependence”, meaning that MS will seek integration either to reap 
benefits or avoid losses (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 179). This rather ambiguous explanation 
 
16 
makes it fundamental to further investigate the preference formation process. Ultimately, the 
set of national positions constitute the EU preference constellation, the ‘starting point’ for the 
negotiation of an EU-level agreement (more details on this will be given in subsection 3.2.2) 
(Frieden & Walter, 2018). Thus, we begin by exploring the key factors that shape national goals, 
or simply ‘national preferences’6 (Moravcsik, 1998), that determine “the way [the national gov-
ernment] orders the possible outcomes of an interaction’ on the EU-level” (Frieden, 1999, p. 
42). The existing literature offers two lines of reasoning behind the national preference for-
mation process, one focusing on domestic economic conditions, the other emphasizing the 
growing importance of domestic political conditions. 
From the economic perspective, MS’ preferences stem from their domestic economic in-
terests, mostly based on their export-dependence, fiscal position, and financial exposure 
(Kudrna & Wasserfallen, 2020; Puetter, 2020; Schimmelfennig, 2015). Recent studies further 
indicate that economic considerations prevail in the national preference formation over political 
considerations such as ‘left-right’ party ideology or public opinion (Kudrna & Wasserfallen, 
2020). Târlea et al. (2019) show that governments acted as ‘risk minimizers’ in response to the 
EA crisis, and adjusted their preferences on EMU reform according to their countries’ financial 
sector exposure towards other EU countries. In particular, they demonstrate a correlation be-
tween greater financial vulnerability and a higher degree of support for Europeanized solutions. 
These findings have two important implications. Firstly, they emphasize it may be difficult to 
align MS’ preferences on EMU reforms as these are ultimately shaped by domestic structural 
economic conditions. At the same time, these results support the view that a greater economic 
interdependence in the Eurozone leads to greater integration (Târlea et al., 2019). 
In contrast, from a political viewpoint, governments’ preferences are guided by vote max-
imization taking into account domestic political conditions comprising societal, ideological, 
and institutional factors (Frieden & Walter, 2018). Concerning the societal factors, the growing 
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role of public opinion is seen as a key determinant of national positions (Schäfer et al., 2020; 
Vilpišauskas, 2013). Evidence found by Degner and Leuffen (2019), demonstrates that govern-
ments, particularly the German government, became more responsive to citizens’ policy de-
mands during the EA crisis. Furthermore, the authors argue that economic conditions do not 
generally prevail in EU politics as demonstrated with the case of Brexit (Degner & Leuffen, 
2019). Moreover, domestic preferences may also be rooted in the ideology of party politics and 
influenced by domestic institutions such as national parliaments (Frieden & Walter, 2018). 
Overall, these contradictory findings pitting economic against political dominance in the 
governmental preferences confirm the complexity in identifying the explanatory factors for na-
tional positions. All of these factors certainly influence governmental preferences, but which 
one of them is more important? Kudrna et al. (2019) offer an overarching argument that recon-
ciles these differing views based on country-specific conditions. This approach explains varia-
tions in the preference formation of EU countries in terms of inclusiveness of actors. While the 
role of governmental actors is found generally dominant, there are countries in which national 
positions are also considerably shaped by the public, political, and business actors, as well as 
EU institutions (Kudrna et al., 2019) (see Appendix E).  
It is worthwhile noting that national positions need to be analyzed with caution as these 
can only be estimated. On the one hand, EU countries’ revealed preferences may not always 
mirror their true preferences, and on the other, these preferences may be limited to the policy 
proposals currently under discussion (Frieden & Walter, 2018).  
Taken together, these findings suggest firstly, that national positions are the sum of the 
complex interaction between different domestic conditions, and secondly, that the diverging 
preferences among EU countries will translate into conflict and bargaining (Degner & Leuffen, 
2019; Puetter, 2020). Ultimately, MS need to reach consensus at both the domestic and EU-
level (Karremans, 2020). 
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3.2.2 EU interstate bargaining 
Let us now turn to the aggregation process of heterogeneous national positions at the EU-level, 
referred to as interstate bargaining. Eventually, the two-way interaction between domestic pref-
erence formation and interstate bargaining translates into policy outcomes that affect the inte-
gration trajectory. Hence, whether national preferences materialize into European policy re-
forms largely depends on the mechanisms of interstate bargaining (Degner & Leuffen, 2019). 
The EU decision-making process is consensus-oriented, which implies that MS trade-off 
their reluctance to delegate sovereignty power against their desire for EU policy co-ordination 
to, for instance, avoid a ‘common bad’ (Biermann et al., 2019; Frieden & Walter, 2018; Puetter 
& Fabbrini, 2016). Thus, MS will adjust their willingness to cooperate according to their dis-
tinct interpretation of this ‘integration paradox’ (Schild, 2020). 
For the sake of simplicity, we can think of EU interstate bargaining as a ‘race’ between 
MS to negotiate a consensus near to their positions. Following this logic, the EU can be seen as 
a ‘negotiation setting’ (Lundgren et al., 2018), and MS’ differing levels of willingness to engage 
in reforms can be attributed to their varying ‘starting points’, namely their diverging preference 
constellations (Biermann et al., 2019). However, this fails to fully explain why some MS may 
be more successful in drawing an EU political output closer to their national position. This 
asymmetric bargaining success can be attributed to a “country’s relative strength within the 
EU” (Karremans, 2020, p. 18), or simply their relative bargaining power (Frieden & Walter, 
2018). According to the bargaining theory, a state’s bargaining power is determined by the 
characteristics of the country itself, the conditions of the bargaining situation such as the pref-
erence constellation of EU actors, and the wider institutional setup of the bargaining game 
(Frieden & Walter, 2018). 
Firstly, rather than focusing on the economic resources, the country’s characteristics 
stress the individual ‘costs of non-agreement’ which establish the degree of political will to 
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compromise as well as the extent of commitment to avoid the reversion point (Biermann et al., 
2019; Frieden & Walter, 2018). During times of crisis, actors under less pressure hold greater 
bargaining power than those who urgently require joint action, and thus, are in a weaker position 
to negotiate (Finke & Bailer, 2018). It should be noted that, although a failed negotiation could 
simply represent the continuation of the status quo (Frieden & Walter, 2018), it could also result 
in an extremely costly reversion point for all MS because, as the German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel warned during the EA crisis, “[i]f the euro fails, Europe fails” (Spiegel, 2010). There-
fore, as status quo costs rise for specific MS, their bargaining power weakens (Schild, 2020).  
Secondly, assuming that consensus emerges from the convergence of preferences, coun-
tries holding more centrist positions along the EU preference constellation are more successful 
in obtaining their preferred outcomes (Lundgren et al., 2018). That is, these ‘neutral’ countries 
take the role of the ‘pivotal voter’ since their support is demanded to conclude an agreement, 
which gives them greater bargaining power (Frieden & Walter, 2018). By contrast, countries 
with strong preferences are forced to make more concessions to incentivize other MS to coop-
erate, which increases their dependency (Schild, 2020). This was the evident case during the 
EA crisis bargaining, in which, despite the strong collective preference to stabilize the EA, 
creditor countries attempted to shift the burden of adjustment to debtor countries 
(Schimmelfennig, 2015). 
Lastly, another source of bargaining power arises from the institutional decision rules of 
the bargaining game. Particularly, a state’s bargaining success may vary depending on whether 
decisions are taken by unanimity or qualified majority voting (Frieden & Walter, 2018). Fur-
thermore, actors may enjoy enhanced bargaining power if they can make credible threats to 
veto proposals or act as the ‘agenda-setters’ controlling the issues available to negotiate 
(Moravcsik, 2018; Schimmelfennig, 2015). 
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Since the EA crisis, it has been widely accepted that the Eurozone is shaped by asymmet-
ric power (Maris & Sklias, 2020). Following this view, particularly Germany is seen as a ‘heg-
emonic’ influence in Europe (Moravcsik, 2018), whereas others attribute the role of ‘most pow-
erful’ MS to both, Germany and France (Schild, 2020). However, the conventional narrative of 
asymmetric dominance is refuted by recent evidence. Lundgren et al. (2018, p. 67) find that 
during the EMU reform negotiations, MS enjoyed a strikingly even bargaining success, thereby 
declaring “no clear winners and losers” (see Appendix F). Nevertheless, the role of agenda-
setting powers is also confirmed by studies. Lundgren et al. (2018) indicate that MS aligned 
with the European Commission’s position benefit from higher bargaining success, whereas 
Degner and Leuffen (2018) show that, even if France and Germany did not dominate, they 
exercised ‘negative power’ to remove certain agenda proposals.  
In sum, these results confirm that the EU interstate bargaining process can only deliver 
an outcome if all MS engage through mutual compromises and concessions to overcome their 
differences (Lundgren et al., 2018). 
4 Discussion 
At the time of writing (December 2020) the world is fighting covid-19 resurgence (World 
Health Organization, 2020). Once again, the asymmetrical design of the Eurozone’s institu-
tional framework has been revealed. Yet this time, the European response to the corona crisis 
stands in remarkable contrast to previous crises. For the first time, the EU has pushed forward 
a €750bn temporary recovery instrument, the Next Generation EU (NGEU) fund (European 
Commission, 2020a). To combat the pandemic’s asymmetrical impact (Lagarde, 2020), the 
NGEU fund will unprecedentedly be financed by common EU debt and €390bn will be pro-
vided as grants to the hardest-hit countries (European Commission, 2020a, 2020b).  
At first glance, one could argue that MS have learned the lessons from past crises, jointly 
calling for financial solidarity rather than imposing austerity measures to stabilize the EA 
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(Matthijs, 2020). Indeed, the European response to the ongoing corona crisis seems reminiscent 
of Monnet’s thinking that ‘Europe will be forged in crises’ (Schimmelfennig, 2018), but it also 
raises many questions about how the pandemic may alter the logic of EU decision-making, now 
that the debate about further burden-sharing has been revived (Kudrna et al., 2020; Schoeller, 
2020). Following this paper’s analogical reasoning and focusing on the so far ‘visible’ events, 
we preliminary assess how the corona crisis, symbolically a ‘superwave’, may alter the structure 
of the presented iceberg model7. 
Regarding the effect of the pandemic on public opinion, it may be assumed that the crisis 
would exacerbate the politicization levels of European integration as previous crises have 
(Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). When the pandemic first hit EU countries, governments were caught 
in a dilemma between public or economic health (Herrera et al., 2020) to which they responded 
with a set of uncoordinated border closures, framing the crisis mostly as a national problem 
(Medeiros et al., 2020). European unity seemed to collapse again under severe pressure 
(Rachman, 2020). As the pandemic spread unequally across the EU, and in the absence of a 
European response, the idea of a borderless Europe was questioned (Hall, Chazan, et al., 2020; 
Opiłowska, 2020; Wolf, 2020). Unsurprisingly, the first survey results show severe drops in 
trust levels in politicians, the media, and the EU, emphasizing a demand for ‘competent lead-
ership and realistic solutions’ (Daniele et al., 2020). Moreover, recent Eurobarometer data 
(2020b) indicates that an absolute majority (54%) supports a larger EU budget to overcome the 
impact of covid-19, positioning public health as the top spending priority. Although the image 
of the EU steadily improves, a majority remains dissatisfied with the (lack of) solidarity shown 
between EU MS, and two out of three respondents think that the EU “should have more com-
petences to deal with crises” (Eurobarometer, 2020b) (see Appendix G). 
As mirrored in the citizen dissatisfaction with EU solidarity, it would be misleading to 
assume the deal of the NGEU has resulted from a sudden preference convergence. While it is 
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true that the approval of the European Recovery Fund marks a historic moment for the EU, its 
negotiation process has exposed deep political fissures (once again). To understand the effect 
of the pandemic on political contestation, we can turn to the literature of crisis decision-making 
which studies how crises serve as catalyzers for change as they increase the clarity of common 
objectives, hereby promoting consensus to achieve these objectives (D’Erman et al., 2020). 
Thus, a major crisis such as the corona crisis marks a ‘critical juncture’ in which “longstanding 
preferences become more fluid” (Schild, 2020, p. 454), helping to surmount divisions when MS 
negotiate under pressure (Fleming & Peel, 2020). This approach is useful to comprehend the 
“historic breakthrough” in EU politics achieved by France and Germany as they astonishingly 
united to advance an ambitious co-ordinated European fiscal response (Hall, Fleming, et al., 
2020; Panetta, 2020; Wolf, 2020). Notwithstanding their longstanding policy differences over 
the need for greater burden-sharing, the Franco-German cooperation has been instrumental in 
bringing about the idea of a European fund, later formalized by the European Commission as 
the NGEU, to ensure a ‘more even comeback’ providing ‘fiscal space’ to weaker economies 
(Fleming, Mallet, et al., 2020; Fleming & Peel, 2020).  
However, rather than recalibrating the EU preference constellation, the significant shift 
in Germany’s attitude towards fiscal transfers evidenced the existing political tensions (Khalaf, 
2020). First, the idea of providing grants to stricken countries was met with resistance from the 
‘frugal four’ (the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Austria) (Khan & Fleming, 2020), and 
more recently, Hungary and Poland attempted to block the negotiation process threatening to 
veto Europe’s fund in protest against the new rule of law safeguards (Fleming, Peel, et al., 
2020). In the end, after a two-day Euro Summit in Brussels, the 27 EU MS surmounted divisions 
to unlock the historic €750bn package involving the unprecedented European debt issuance 
(Fleming & Peel, 2020).  
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Germany’s break with its longstanding commitment to frugality, as reflected in Merkel’s 
famous vow of “there won’t be Eurobonds as long as I live” (Spiegel, 2012), raises the question 
of whether the corona crisis will mark a historic turning point for European integration. On an 
optimistic note, the European Commission (2020c) plans to turn the extraordinary challenges 
of the corona crisis into a unique opportunity to bounce back stronger by investing in “a greener, 
more digital and more resilient Europe”. On a more skeptical note, the fact that the NGEU fund 
is a temporary crisis-fighting tool downplays its significance (Arnold, 2020). The argument for 
a permanent system of fully mutualized debt has already gained much attention given the grow-
ing demands for greater solidarity to mutualize the fiscal costs to tackle this crisis (Financial 
Times, 2020a; Fleming & Peel, 2020; Regan et al., 2020). At the same time, even if the recovery 
fund is not permanent, it has the potential to permanently alter how the EU handles future crises 
(Financial Times, 2020b; Fleming & Peel, 2020).  
The forceful response to the crisis is seen as another “whatever it takes” moment from 
EU leaders confirming their political commitment to preserving the EU (Wolf, 2020). Yet, 
bearing in mind the saying, “do not to count your chickens before they hatch”, the EU’s moment 
of truth remains to be determined by the success of the NGEU (Hall, Chazan, et al., 2020). That 
is, even if the NGEU symbolically represents a promising step in the right direction, it could 
also represent a potentially dangerous moment for the EU (Münchau, 2020; The Economist, 
2020). In other words, if the recovery fund is well-spent, it could present a unique window of 
opportunity to address productivity concerns (Arnold, 2020) – yet, if funds are mismanaged, 
the risk of exacerbating pre-existing economic inequalities is very real (Arnold, 2020; Bergsen, 
2020; Hall, Chazan, et al., 2020). Critically, the NGEU fund is no cure-all for the EU but simply 
a recovery tool that must be combined with ambitious structural reforms – if the gap among EU 
countries is ever sought to be closed (Roldán, 2020; Vallée, 2020).  
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Additionally, the implementation of reforms is necessary to increase the growth potential 
of EU countries, which will be crucial to tackle the record-high budget deficits fueled by the 
pandemic crisis without undermining the long-term financial sustainability (Arnold, 2020; 
Financial Times, 2020c). After all, even if the recovery fund pushed the boundaries of what is 
politically feasible, building new instruments for each crisis is not an option since an EU agree-
ment becomes extremely difficult to secure when the political momentum dissipates (Bergsen, 
2020; Fleming & Peel, 2020). 
5 Conclusion 
This paper aimed to shed light on how EU politics and the course of European integration in-
tertwine. We argued that EU political conflict structures reinforce the reform deadlock, hereby 
constraining European integration, and ultimately, accentuating the incomplete and fragile na-
ture of the EMU architecture. Based on existing literature, this paper proposes a theoretical 
framework to conceptualize the complex system of EU politics, differentiating between the 
‘visible’ dimensions of politicization and political contestation, and the ‘often not visible’ pro-
cesses of domestic preference formation and EU interstate bargaining. The findings of this 
research suggest that EU policy outcomes depend on MS’ ability to overcome significant po-
litical barriers to reach consensus. These findings have three broader implications.  
First, the iceberg model emphasizes the constant two-way political interaction between 
the domestic and the EU-level. In particular, it illustrates how rapidly changing political dy-
namics at the national level add to the EU political disequilibrium and potentially translate into 
EU policy outcomes (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2018; Karremans, 2020). Second, the paper fur-
ther underlines the need to consider the new changing political dynamics when looking at the 
European integration process through the lenses of integration theories. It is only by truly un-
derstanding the complex relationship between these changing political dynamics and the course 
of European integration, that it is possible to adopt far-reaching reforms (Jones et al., 2016; 
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Kudrna, 2017; Wasserfallen et al., 2018). Finally, these findings confirm the key role of con-
temporary EU politics in determining the path of European integration (Copelovitch et al., 
2016). Returning to the initial hypothesis, it is now possible to state that political obstacles 
impose limits on the EU’s ability to advance on its integration agenda. 
By investigating the EU political conflict structures, this contribution adds to the literature 
on European integration from a political economy perspective. However, further work needs to 
address the increasing complexity of EU politics since this paper is limited by the static nature 
of the theoretical framework presented. Additionally, as the corona crisis continues to test the 
stability of the EU, its full impact is yet to be analyzed. An important issue to resolve for future 
studies is whether the EU may end up being politically strengthened or fragmented by the co-
rona crisis. The recovery fund marks a historic advance for European integration, yet it remains 
to be seen whether it has unfortunate side effects that could accentuate distributional issues and 
endanger the EU’s cohesion.  
Challenging times still lie ahead, and whether the corona crisis will ‘make or break’ the 
EU remains to be seen in the future (Regan et al., 2020). Clearly, the EU’s fragile state cannot 
endure another political crisis, and fundamental reforms cannot be postponed anymore. The EU 
leaders’ moment of truth has come to unite in solidarity, reconfirm their political commitment, 
and move the EU beyond the political impasse. Once and for all, EU leaders need to join their 
efforts in a spirit of compromise and break down political barriers to prioritize the shared inter-
ests of all EU citizens. More than ever, it is now the EU leaders’ moment of truth to pave the 
way to recovery through the adoption of forward-looking reforms that ensure the longer-term 
sustainability of the EU. As Vice-President of the European Central Bank Luis de Guindos 
(2020) declares, “[t]his will take a heightened level of political will and ambition from all sides 
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Appendix A. Revisiting the integration theories 
Table 1. Grand theories of integration. Source: Own illustration. 
 Grand schools of integration 




Theorists Haas (1958/2004) Moravcsik (1998) Hooghe and Marks (2009) 
Standpoint Supranational actors Member States 




Integration as a cooperative 
process resulting from the 
interplay among societal ac-
tors 
Integration as a coopera-
tive process resulting from 
the interplay among na-
tional governments  
Integration as a conflictual 
process  
Politicization as a con-




‘Spillover’ effects and path-
dependencies  
Interstate bargaining 
driven by domestic socio-
economic interests 
Public opinion and govern-
ment motivations for its 
preferences 
Focus on  Supranational Reform 
Domestic preference for-
mation 
Domestic Politics: the shift 
from ‘permissive consen-








(Theory of disintegration) 
Economics vs.   
Politics  
Primacy of economics over 
politics 
Primacy of economics 
over politics 
Primacy of politics over 
economics 
Limitations 
Fails to consider intergov-
ernmental bargaining 
Distorted ‘Snapshot’: dis-
regards path-dependencies  
Fails to consider political 
interests and the growing 
influence of supranational 
actors 
Explanatory relevance 
questioned as it fails to ex-
plain why the EA crisis re-
sulted in deeper integration 
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Appendix B. Politicization shown in Eurobarometer data 
Figure 2. The politicization of EU affairs. Source: Figure from Börzel and Risse (2018), Data from Rauh and Zürn 
(2016).  
 
Note: As Figure 2 shows, the politicization of EU affairs has been rising steadily since 1990. 
These results by Rauh and Zürn (2016) are based on the analysis of the media and protests 
across the EU. The peaks in politicization illustrated in the figure show a correlation with sig-
nificant integration steps.  
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Figure 3. Perceived benefits and costs of the EU Membership for national states. Source: Own illustration; Data from 
Eurobarometer (2020a) 
 
Note: Survey respondents were asked the question, “Taking everything into consideration, 
would you say that (your country) ‘has on balance benefited’/’would benefit’ or not from being 
a member of the EU?”. The figure shows a rise in the perceived ‘costs’ after 2009. Eurobarom-




Figure 4. Public trust levels in European institutions and the European Union. Source: Own illustration; Data from 
Eurobarometer (2020a)  
 
Note: Aggregated data for comparison reasons. Survey respondents were asked separately 
about their trust levels for each European institution / the EU, “[do] you tend to trust [institution] 
or tend not to trust [institution]?”. Eurobarometer data (2005-2019) – no data available from 
2013 to 2017 for the European Council.  
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Figure 5. Public trust levels in national governments and the European Union. Source: Own illustration; Data from 
Eurobarometer (2020a)  
 
Note: Aggregated data for comparison reasons. Survey respondents were asked separately 
about their trust levels for the EU and respective national governments, “[do] you tend to trust 
[institution] or tend not to trust [institution]?”. Eurobarometer data (2005-2019). 
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Figure 6. Image of the European Union. Source: Own illustration; Data from Eurobarometer (2020a)  
 
Note: Survey respondents were asked the question: “In general, does the European Union con-
jure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?”. 
Possible answers were: “Fairly positive (4.0), Very positive (5.0), Fairly negative(2.0), Very 
negative (1.0), DK - Don't know, Neutral (3.0)”. For representation purposes, only the responses 
of “Fairly positive (4.0)” are shown in the graph. Eurobarometer data (2002-2019). 
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Figure 7. Public support for the euro. Source: Own illustration; Data from Eurobarometer (2020a)  
 
Note: Survey respondents were asked the question: “Please tell me whether you are for or 
against: A European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro.” The 
graph shows the % of Eurozone citizens in favor of a European economic and monetary union 
with one single currency, the euro. The support for the euro declines from 2007 and starts to 
rise sharply after 2013. Eurobarometer data (2004-2019). 
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Figure 8. Identification with nation and/or EU. Source: Own illustration; Data from Eurobarometer (2020a)  
 
Note: The graph shows the identification levels with the nation and/or EU. Strikingly, in 2009 
the “Nationality only” surpassed “Nationality and European” identification levels. Source: Eu-




Figure 9. Feeling of European citizenship. Source: Own illustration; Data from Eurobarometer (2020a)  
 
Note: The volatile development of the feeling of European citizenship in the aftermath of the 
EA crisis is highlighted in the graph. Eurobarometer data (2010-2019). 
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Appendix C. Divergent trends shown in Eurostat data 
Figure 10. Structural divergences in the Eurozone exacerbated during the Eurozone Crisis; Source: Wolf (2020) 
 
 




Figure 12. North vs. South: GDP growth averages. Source: Own illustration, Data from Eurostat (2020b) 
 
Figure 13. North vs. South: Unemployment rates fall but remain too high. Source: Own illustration, Data from Eurostat 
(2020c) 
 
Note regarding Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
For comparison purposes, we distinguish between the “Northern” and “Southern” groups, each 
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with prevailing economic interests. We adopt the classification of countries proposed by 
Kudrna (2017). The “Northern” group includes Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, Netherlands, and Slovakia; and the “Southern” group comprises Belgium, Cy-
prus, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain. 
 
Appendix D. Political contestation shown in the ‘EMU Positions’ dataset 
Figure 14. Fiscal transfer vs. fiscal discipline as a one-dimensional conflict. Source: Lehner and Wasserfallen (2019) 
 
 




Note: Austria (AUT); Belgium (BEL); Bulgaria (BGR); Cyprus (CYP); Czech Republic (CZE); 
Germany (DEU); Denmark (DNK); Spain (ESP); Estonia (EST); Finland (FIN); France (FRA); 
United Kingdom (GBR); Greece (GRC); Croatia (HRV); Hungary (HUN); Ireland (IRL); Italy 
(ITA); Lithuania (LTU); Luxemburg (LUX); Latvia (LVA); Malta (MLT); Netherlands (NLD); 
Poland (POL); Portugal (PRT); Romania (ROU); Slovakia (SVK); Slovenia (SVN); and Swe-
den (SWE); European Commission (COM); European Council (COU); European Central Bank 




Figure 16. EMU reforms (2010-15): The ‘North-South’ divide and the ideal point estimates of MS positions along the 





Figure 17. EMU Positions dataset (2010-15): The idea of a mutualization of Eurozone debts. Source: EMU Choices 
(2019) retrieved online at https://emuchoices.eu/data/emup/ (accessed October 20, 2020) 
 
Note: The idea of Eurozone debt mutualization was proposed to safeguard the stability of the 
Eurozone in 2010. The policy space comprises three possible scores: 0: No, not even in the 
long-term; 50: Not now, without any indication when; 100: Yes, in principle now, but under 
certain circumstances (EMU Choices, 2019). Interestingly, the score of Germany of “0” stands 
in stark contrast to its current position supporting the EU recovery fund, partly raised by com-
mon EU debt.  
 
Background information on the ‘EMU Positions’ dataset 
As shown below in Table 2, the ‘EMU Positions’ dataset covers 47 issues related to EFSF, 
ESM, Six/Two Packs, Fiscal Compact, and the banking union legislation. Table 3 lists the var-
iations in MS’ positions of a particular contested issue in relation to the one-dimensional divide 
between advocates of fiscal transfer versus discipline (Lehner & Wasserfallen, 2019; Was-
serfallen et al., 2018). The ‘EMU Positions’ dataset has been carried out as part of the ‘EMU 
Choices’ Project, funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation pro-
gram. More information can be found online at https://emuchoices.eu/ 
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Appendix E. Domestic preference formation 
Figure 18. National positions on EMU reforms (2010-15): The weighted average of influence scores of actors influenc-
ing national positions. Source: Figure from Kudrna (2019); Data from Kudrna et al. (2019) 
 
Appendix F. EU interstate bargaining 
Figure 19. EMU reform legislation (2010-25): The average negotiation success of member states. Source: Figure from 




Appendix G. Public opinion in times of covid-19 shown in Eurobarometer data 
Figure 20. Two in three respondents agree: The EU should have more competences to deal with crises such as the 
coronavirus pandemic. Source: Eurobarometer (2020b) 
 
 
Figure 21. More than every second European thinks that the EU should have a bigger budget to overcome the conse-




Figure 22. In 20 EU Member States, a majority of the respondents agree that the EU should have a bigger budget to 
overcome the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. Source: Eurobarometer (2020b) 
 
 
Figure 23. Public health and economic recovery top the list of spending priorities. Climate change joins the top three. 







1 Please note that an evaluation of the integration theories is not the focus of this work.  
 
2 It should be noted, however, that these theories suffer from shortcomings as they only partially explain 
why the EA crisis translated into deeper integration – making a further investigation of integration dynamics crit-
ical. For more details on the integration theories, please refer to Schimmelfennig, F., & Winzen, T. (2019, 
2019/08/03). Grand theories, differentiated integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 26(8), 1172-1192. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1576761  
, Webber, D. (ibid.). Trends in European political (dis)integration. An analysis of postfunctionalist and 
other explanations. 1134-1152. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1576760 . 
 
3 Note, that political contestation lays in between the ‘visible’ and ‘often not visible’ dimensions of the 
presented model, and thereby, the composition of its conflict structures is not always obvious to analyze. Critical 
moments such as crises may shed light on the dynamics of political contestation, facilitating its examination. For 
the sake of simplicity, this paper only considers the ‘observed’ political contestation, that is, its ‘visible’ dimension.   
 
4 The term ‘polycleavages’ refers to the multiple and simultaneous issue-specific divisions created by the 
polycrisis. See Zeitlin, J., Nicoli, F., & Laffan, B. (2019, 2019/07/03). Introduction: the European Union beyond 
the polycrisis? Integration and politicization in an age of shifting cleavages. Journal of European Public Policy, 
26(7), 963-976. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1619803  
 
5 De Grauwe (2019) illustrates how the cost of adjustment in response to the EA crisis was mainly carried 
by the deficit countries, which were forced to implement harsh austerity and structural reforms that eventually led 
to public upheaval. This asymmetric cost of adjustment represents one of the design failures of the Eurozone 
system. See De Grauwe, P. (2019, March 14, 2019). The Future of Eurozone: what reforms are needed. Hellenic 
Observatory Athens Lectures, Athens, Greece. http://www.lse.ac.uk/Hellenic-Observatory/Events/Athens-
Lectures/The-Future-of-the-Eurozone 
 
6 Throughout this paper, as we refer to the diverging national goals among EU countries, we use the term 
(policy) ‘positions’ and ‘preferences’ interchangeably. 
 
7 Given that the pandemic is still ongoing, the impact of the corona pandemic on EU politics and European 
integration is yet to be assessed. This paper only provides a preliminary attempt to assess the impact of the so far 
‘visible’ events. An analysis of the full extent of the impact of the corona crisis on the EU falls outside the scope 
of this paper. 
                                                 
 
 
